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ABSTRACT 
Labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods is a contentious issue and internationally, there is 
sharp division whether such labeling ought to be mandatory.  This debate has reached India where the 
government has proposed mandatory labeling.  In this context, this paper evaluates the optimal regulatory 
approach to GM food labels. Mandatory labeling aims to provide greater information and correspondingly 
more informed consumer choice.  However, even without such laws, markets have incentives to supply 
labeling.  So can mandatory labeling achieve outcomes different from voluntary labeling?  The paper 
shows that this is not the case in most situations.  The paper goes on to explore the special set of 
circumstances, where mandatory labeling makes a difference to outcomes.  If these outcomes are 
intended, mandatory labeling is justified; otherwise not. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Policies towards labeling of genetically modified or GM foods have varied between countries.  
The great divide is between the European Union that has favored mandatory labeling and the United 
States, which has chosen not to impose such requirements.  Developing countries have also been 
confronted with this issue.  While Brazil and China have adopted mandatory labeling laws, Philippines 
and South Africa have pursued approaches based on voluntary labeling.  In India, a recent 
recommendation from the Ministry of Health has proposed mandatory labeling of all GM foods.  In light 
of this proposal and the absence of an international consensus, this paper evaluates the optimal regulatory 
approach to GM food labels.   In particular, what can justify a mandatory labeling policy?  Although the 
Indian context provides the motivation, the core arguments in this paper are applicable to other country 
contexts as well.   
Unlike many other quality attributes of agricultural produce, genetic modification cannot be 
known by visual inspection or even after consuming the good.   In the terminology of Darbi and Karni  
(1973) for classification of goods, GM attribute is neither a search attribute nor an experience attribute but 
rather a credence attribute.   
Therefore, GM labeling is meaningful only when there is certification that verifies the labeled 
status.  Such certification is typically costly to produce.  In the generic case, a food product cannot be 
verified to be GM-free unless documented steps have been taken to preserve the identity of the product in 
the production and marketing chain.   
 In the usual kind of instances that are subject to labeling requirements, labeling costs are trivial.  
Examples are laws that require packaged products to display the weight of the product or the nutritional 
composition of foods.  The seller either already possesses the information or can obtain it through 
inexpensive tests.  Moreover, the label itself can be verified by a third party (an inspector or a court) 
through relatively simple means.  As we shall argue, the consequences are quite different when labeling 
costs, as in the GM case, are non-trivial.   
Two kinds of justifications are commonly offered in favor of mandatory labeling: that it is 
necessary to warn consumers about potential health impacts and that such labeling is a response to a 
consumer’s right to know.  We evaluate these arguments in the context of a policy world where besides 
mandatory labeling, governments have other policy instruments as well – namely the specification of 
quality standards and laws that facilitate voluntary labeling.  We will argue that labeling is not the 
appropriate response to concerns about health impacts and that the only legitimate argument for 
mandatory labeling rests on consumer’s right to know.  But does mandatory labeling result in consumers  
  2
receiving greater information?  And does it increase economic welfare as a result?   This is the question 
that we explore in this paper.   
There is a rapidly growing literature on optimal labeling policies for GM foods.  Results vary 
depending on how each paper defines the content of mandatory labeling, on how the costs of labeling are 
borne by market participants, and whether the policy is evaluated from the point of view of producers or 
consumers or of society as a whole.  The literature makes a distinction between a positive label (“this 
product may contain GM organisms”) and negative label (“this product contains no GM organisms”).   
Quite clearly, voluntary labeling could only be of the negative kind while mandatory labeling could be of 
either type.  Runge and Jackson (2000) argue that voluntary negative labeling policies would be optimal 
while Crespi and Marette (2003) show that the socially optimal label depends on the number of 
consumers averse to GM foods.  A similar result is derived by Kirchhoff and Zago (2001) who show that 
the comparison between mandatory and voluntary labeling depends on the distribution of consumer 
preferences and in particular on the extent of consumer aversion to GM foods. Carter and Gruere (2003) 
argue that mandatory labeling does not facilitate consumer choice and acts as a market barrier. In its 
presence GM products do not appear at the retail shelf.  These results depend on the assumption that in 
some scenarios, the labeling cost is borne by suppliers of GM foods.  However, in so far as it is non-GM 
foods that command a price premium such an assumption is not incentive compatible.   
In this paper, we assume non-GM products would command a premium over the GM products (at 
least for the first generation of GM foods which involve no significant benefits to the consumer).  If this 
is so, then the onus is on the producer who claims GM-free status to be able to prove it.  Suppliers of GM 
foods who label their products accordingly do not have to prove so and therefore do not have to incur the 
costs of segregation and identity preservation.
1   
Unlike previous authors, we conclude that under standard assumptions on consumer preferences, 
mandatory and voluntary labeling are equivalent.  The market share of GM food is invariant to the policy 
regime. The extent of consumer aversion to GM foods will matter to the market share of GM food but 
given consumer preferences, the policy regime does not matter to the market share.   
By departing from standard assumptions, the paper sketches a scenario where outcomes under 
mandatory labeling can be different from that under voluntary labeling.  In this scenario, preferences for 
some consumers are `label-sensitive’ i.e., their preferences change on encountering a label.  However, 
when this is so, it is not possible to compare welfare under the two labeling scenarios.   
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section surveys labeling policies internationally and 
the proposed laws in India.  If a label is to be verified, certain mechanisms must be employed.  These are 
                                                 
1 This is recognized in Moschini and Lapan (2006) and Lapan and Moschini (2007)  
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described in Section 3.  Section 4 distinguishes between quality standards and labeling policies.  The 
section argues that known health and safety considerations are best handled by prescription of quality 
standards rather than labeling policies.  The consumer’s right to know is the only legitimate argument for 
mandatory labeling.  This is closely examined in Section 5 that shows that under standard assumptions on 
the stability of preferences, mandatory labeling does not improve upon the outcomes achieved by 
voluntary labeling.   Section 6 argues that even with voluntary labeling, the government has a role to play 
in setting standards and in requiring labeling to be truthful.  Section 7 relaxes the assumption of stable 
preferences.  Here consumers are allowed to change their demand upon seeing a label.  Section 8 reports a 
limited experiment that showed that consumers were price-sensitive visa-a-vis “high quality” goods.  
Conclusions are collected in Section 9.   
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2.  Parameters of Labeling Laws 
Labeling policies can vary across countries according to the following parameters.   
(i)  Specifying what is legal:  The contrast here is between mandatory labeling laws and voluntary 
labeling policies.  The latter also requires a legal framework in so far as labels are required to be truthful.  
Countries may also develop standards and guidelines that govern the use of voluntary labels. 
(ii)  Scope of labeling:   The mandatory labeling provision could apply to some foods or to all 
foods.  The scope is narrowest when the labeling provision is restricted to foods with detectable levels of 
GM materials (transgenic protein or DNA).  The scope can be expanded to include highly processed 
products derived from GM ingredients but containing no detectable levels of transgenic protein.  Some 
countries may also require that GM labeling apply to animal feed, additives and flavors, meat and animal 
products fed with GM feed and to food sold in restaurants.   
(iii)  Threshold levels: What is the maximum threshold level above which a food is regarded as 
genetically modified?  The tolerance levels range from 0.1 to 5 percent.  
(iv)  Enforcement:  This is a particular issue in developing countries where regulations may not 
be enforced strictly.   
The scope of labeling also automatically implies the verification mechanisms that need to 
accompany labeling.  If labeling is required only for foods with detectable levels of GM ingredients, then 
verification of `GM-free’ status can rely on testing of the final product for genetically modified protein or 
DNA.  However, if labeling is extended to processed foods where existing testing mechanism cannot 
detect the transgenic DNA accurately or at a reasonable cost, then compliance for these products will 
require evidence of `identity preservation’ (IP). 
2  An IP system requires production, processing and 
distribution systems where the identity of the food or trait is preserved (Smyth and Phillips 2002).  This 
could result in segmented channels of production, processing and marketing.   
Countries can be placed in a matrix according to the stringency of their regulations with respect to 
type of labeling (mandatory vs. voluntary), scope of labeling, the accompanying verification mechanisms 
(process or product), the prescribed tolerance levels and the extent of enforcement (Gruere and Rao 
2007).  The international comparisons reveal that labeling regulations have the widest scope in the 
European Union, Brazil and China.  Indeed, in terms of the law, regulations are more stringent in Brazil 
and China. In Brazil, there are no exemptions to the labeling law while the EU excludes meat and animal 
products.  Similarly, in China, the tolerance level is 0 percent while it is 0.9 percent in EU.  However, 
                                                 
2 Even where product testing is feasible, companies may still follow IP to make sure the final product measures up to 
the  advertised claim regarding its source  of ingredients.    
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operationally it is the EU laws that are most stringent because they are implemented fully while they are 
not implemented at all in Brazil and only partially implemented in China.   
Japan, South Korea and some other countries in southeast Asia also have mandatory labeling 
laws.  However, they exclude processed products and their tolerance level is usually in the range from 1-5 
percent.  Canada, Argentina, South Africa, Philippines and the United States have voluntary labeling laws 
(or draft proposals) based on product content.   
Within this range of international experiences, the Indian draft law proposes mandatory labeling 
laws that are among the most stringent globally.  There are no exemptions either in terms of animal 
products or processed foods.  The draft rules state that “a GM food, derived there from, whether it is 
primary or processed or any ingredient of food, food additives or any food product that may contain GM 
material shall be compulsorily labeled, without any exceptions”. The definition of a GM food makes it 
clear that it includes foods that are produced from genetically modified organisms even though the foods 
may not themselves contain it.  Examples of such foods would be soy oil and meat from animals that are 
fed on genetically modified grains.  Hence the verification mechanism that is proposed is that of identity 
preservation.  The tolerance level is not specified, which may imply a 0 percent threshold level. 
If applicable, the label would indicate that the foods have been subject to genetic modification.  
The requirement is applicable for both imported and domestically produced food items.  In the case of 
imported foods, an additional requirement is that the label will also indicate that the product has been 
cleared for marketing and use in the country of origin.   
  6
3.   Verification  Mechanisms 
Under the proposed Indian draft law, suppliers of GM food would have to label their foods 
accordingly.  The implication is that an unlabeled food is GM-free.  Suppliers of unlabeled foods would 
therefore have to supply documentation to support the claim that their product is GM-free.  When an 
organism is genetically modified, it means that a fragment of 'foreign' DNA is introduced, that 
manufactures a protein not normally produced by that species. Protein-based methods of detection (the 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay or ELISA tests) involve antibodies or enzymes that detect either the 
newly introduced protein, or its by-products.  The test is specific to the protein expressed by the 
transgene.  These methods have significant limitations and are best used for fresh, raw foodstuffs.  Even 
here, the methods are not very accurate; however it is inexpensive.   
DNA-based methods (PCR tests) use the newly introduced 'foreign' DNA as a 'tag' or marker for 
detecting a GM product.  DNA markers could include the new gene itself, or the accompanying 
promoter/terminator gene or the marker genes that confer antibiotic resistance.  While DNA-based 
methods are more reliable and more expensive as well, there are several challenges as well.  The first step 
in the procedure is to extract the DNA from the food sample.  As the target DNA might be present in 
quantities too minute for detection, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is used to amplify the target DNA.  
PCR reactions are available for the limited number of markers that are popularly used in genetic 
modification.  However, as new GM foods are developed, the old markers may be discontinued and new 
ones used.  Hence the technology for detection must keep pace with the development of GM foods.   
The other challenge to DNA based methods is that food processing can contribute to significant 
degradation of target DNA.  Indeed, DNA detection methods are not applicable to refined sugars or oils, 
because plant DNA is completely separated or destroyed in the course of processing.  A third limitation is 
that some common food components inhibit PCR reaction, reduce the amplification process and therefore 
may not be able to detect GM ingredients.  These include calcium, iron and trace heavy metals, 
carbohydrates, tannins, phenolics, and salts. 
The fourth challenge is to be able to quantify precisely the amount of GM material.  To detect 
minute quantities, one would need to increase the extent of PCR amplification.  Clearly then, it would be 
far more expensive to test for threshold limits at say 0.1 percent than at 1 percent.   
An instance of the difficulties in detecting GM ingredients is oil derived from GM soybeans.  The 
proteins of the `foreign’ DNA are largely retained by the de-oiled cake.  As a result, the oils contain very 
minute foreign DNA that cannot be reliably tested and quantified.  Thus, there is no reliable way to 
distinguish soy oil from GM soybean from that of soy oil from non-GM beans.  
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The only way this can be done is to construct a separate production and marketing channel for the 
two oils so that their identity is preserved up to the time the oil reaches the consumer. Identity 
preservation is a complex and expensive procedure. The process begins with the purity of seed. Then on 
the farmers’ fields non-GM beans would have to be grown separately. The fields must be isolated to 
prevent cross-pollination or contamination from GM beans.  Guidelines have to be formulated for 
minimum isolation distance that would vary from crop to crop. All equipment, bins, storage containers 
must be cleaned and inspected before and after each use. Similar segregation would have to accompany 
the transport of beans to the wholesale markets and then onto the oil mills where they would have to be 
stored, processed and packaged in separate facilities.  As all this would have to be capable of verification, 
there would have to be appropriate documentation of the separate market channel and the movement of 
the product through it.   
It should be noted that even when product-testing verification is feasible, it might call for some 
segregation.  For instance, with respect to grains, even though it would be possible to test for their GM 
status, the only way of ensuring a GM-free status would be to physically separate them from GM grain in 
production, transport and storage.   
The major costs of GM labeling arise from identity preservation and associated segregation 
systems.  As discussed earlier, the cost would be borne by the supplier of the GM-free product.   A close 
analogue is the structure of the organic food industry.  Organic foods command a premium and it is the 
suppliers of these foods who incur the costs of segregation in production, processing and transport.  
However, even GM producers might have to incur IP costs in some cases.  An instance of this is the case 
where corn containing the Starlink gene was approved for feed but not for human consumption.  A 
supplier of GM corn might then be required to demonstrate that it does not contain Starlink gene (as is 
required for US corn exports to Japan).
3   
Some estimates are available of IP costs in the United States and other developed countries.  
Moss, Schmitz and Schmitz (2002) compile IP costs from various studies done up to 2000.  Most of these 
computations are from IP costs in the marketing channel and ignore the separation costs at the farm level.  
For an average grain price of $2 per bushel, the numbers in their paper indicate IP costs in the range of 8 
to 16 percent of the product price.  In the only study of a developing country, de Leon, Manalo and 
Guilatco (2004) estimate that IP costs due to mandatory labeling would lead to an increase of 11-12 
percent of total costs in the food trade and processing sector in the Philippines.  There are other estimates 
                                                 
3 The EU mandates that GM products must be `traceable’, i.e., all handlers of GM products must be able to identify 
their supplier and the firms to which their products have been supplied.    
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as well which are presented in terms of the additional cost per capita.  However, it is not clear how to 
interpret them and what magnitude should be considered large or small.    
  9
4.  Quality Standards and Labeling 
It is important to distinguish labeling laws from prescription of quality standards.  The latter is a 
common kind of government intervention all around the world.  For reasons of health and safety, the 
government prescribes minimum quality standards for many food and manufactured items.  In the Indian 
context, an example is the Fruit Products Order of 1955 that specifies minimum standards for the 
processing of fruit and vegetable products.  These are mandatory for all companies in this line of activity.  
However, not all quality prescriptions are of this kind.  The government can also prescribe specifications 
and standards and allow the compliance with it to be voluntary.  However, those who comply can freely 
advertise this fact.  Examples of this are AGMARK specifications for agricultural produce.
4 
Although labeling laws are closely related to quality standards, they are conceptually distinct.  
Quality standards are motivated by health and safety considerations.  Society considers exposure to some 
risks unacceptable and when this is not in doubt, one response can be to lay down minimum quality 
specifications whether for fruit juices, electrical cables or automobiles.  In specifying quality standards, 
the government makes a decision on what products will be available in the market on behalf of 
consumers.   
Labeling, on the other hand, is a response based on the consumer’s right to know.  Here the 
government acknowledges consumer concerns about the product’s attributes but does not judge these 
concerns to be widely applicable to all consumers.  A requirement to label products relevant to consumer 
concerns signals the relevant attribute to consumers and allows them to make the choice.   
Implicit in this argument are two assumptions.  The first is that without labeling consumers are 
unable to ascertain characteristics of the product whether through visual inspection or even indeed after 
use.  The second is that consumers are interested in knowing about the labeled characteristics.  Thus, for 
instance, consider a law that requires foods to label the nutritional composition of foods.  The idea is that 
consumers would like to make choices based on such information – say, cholesterol content.  However, 
the consumer has no means by which to detect and quantify such food properties.   
Quality standards, however, may not be considered appropriate here because while cholesterol is 
manifestly a health risk in a statistical sense, medical science does not tell us the causal mechanism and 
nor is the association between cholesterol and health status reasonably uniform across all individuals.  On 
the other hand, if consumers are informed about scientific evidence, then they could make their own 
decisions provided they receive enough information about the cholesterol levels in their food purchases.   
                                                 
4 Compliance is compulsory for some commodities for export.    
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Governments, of course, have to decide what health or safety issues are applicable to all 
consumers and which are relevant to only a subset of them.  This can differ between governments and 
over time as well.   For instance, recently the State of New York in the United States has banned the use 
of partially hydrogenated oils in restaurants rather than merely require the restaurants to signal its use.   
  
  11
5.  Can Mandatory Labeling Make a Difference? 
  The case for mandatory labeling for GM products is often made on three grounds.  The 
first reason that is advanced is that GM foods have known adverse health effects and therefore consumers 
should be informed before they decide to consume them.  However, as discussed earlier, if such effects 
are well known and if they operate uniformly over the population, then the appropriate response should be 
to impose quality standards such that these foods are excluded.  Therefore, this is not a valid ground for 
mandatory labeling. The health impacts of GM foods are not universally accepted.  In all countries, 
including India, commercial approval of GM foods is contingent on extensive tests for food safety among 
other things.  So it is evident that a GM food can be legally available only if the product does not result in 
any known health impacts.   
The second reason that is advanced for mandatory labeling is that GM foods may have unknown 
but probable health impacts especially if they are consumed over long periods of time.  The population 
has not been exposed to such foods for enough time for these impacts to be measured.  Because of lack of 
data, this cannot be confirmed or refuted by scientific evidence.  However, as consumers may nonetheless 
form preferences because of these unknown impacts, mandatory labeling would endow consumers with 
the right to know.   
  The third reason stems from religious or ethical preferences.  Some consumers may not 
wish to consume GM food for these reasons.  Here again, mandatory labeling could be advanced as a 
reason to inform consumer choices.   
This suggests that the basic purposes of introducing mandatory labeling are the twin objectives of 
providing information and greater consumer choice.  A common argument for mandatory labeling that 
illustrates these supposed  impacts is the following.  In the absence of labeling, consumers cannot 
distinguish between GM and GM-free foods.  Firms supply only GM food and because of ignorance, even 
those consumers that are averse to GM foods end up consuming these foods.  Mandatory labeling informs 
these consumers who accordingly shift demand to GM-free foods, which therefore results in the supply of 
these foods to meet their preferences.   Thus, in the absence of mandatory labeling, consumers have no 
choice but to consume GM-foods.  On the other hand, mandatory labeling results in provision of both GM 
and GM-free foods, and the consumer has the choice of consuming according to her or his preferences. 
This seemingly reasonable argument fails to hold up, however, whenever labeling involves fixed costs.   
The reason is that a complete justification of mandatory labeling must include a demonstration 
that the market on its own would fail to provide the information and choice that mandatory labeling can  
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provide.  Note that it is not the case that the market outcome involves no labeling at all.  Product 
differentiation with voluntary labeling is a market response to varying consumer preferences.  Therefore, 
the mandatory labeling case would have to be compared with voluntary labeling rather than the no 
labeling case.  For instance, in North America, which does not have a mandatory labeling law, there is 
considerable voluntary labeling accompanied by IP and segregation in order to meet consumer 
preferences.  It is estimated that 2.5 million acres of corn and soybean have been identity-preserved and 
directed to the non-GM market segment every year since the late 1990s (Kalaitzandonakes 2004).  If food 
suppliers voluntarily label produce, would mandatory labeling be needed? 
Suppose all the producers have the same cost differential of producing GM vs. non-GM food, 
with GM food being cheaper than the non-GM food. In addition to the variable cost there is a fixed cost 
of undergoing the process of certification and providing a label. Further assume that consumers differ in 
their willingness to pay for the GM-free variety of food, with some consumers willing to pay more than 
others.  Following the literature, in this section we assume that the willingness to pay for GM-free food 
does not depend on whether and what label is attached to the food. In   other words, consumers have 
stable preferences. 
If the segment of consumers willing to pay more for GM-free variant is sufficiently large, so that 
it is profitable to product differentiate, producers on their own would supply both variants of the product 
to the market with identity preservation. Mandatory labeling would not result in additional benefits.  It 
could result in additional costs, however, because of the administrative and legal infrastructure associated 
with such a policy.   
Consider the other situation, where the market size for GM-free variant is small and not viable for 
segregation.  In the absence of mandatory labeling, the GM-free food would not be supplied.  But the 
introduction of mandatory labeling would not change the economics of private suppliers.  As the market 
size for GM-free foods remains small, only the GM variant would be supplied to the market and 
producers would not bother to identity preserve the GM-free foods.  The only difference from the 
benchmark case would be that while earlier products were not labeled, they would now be labeled under 
the mandatory provision as containing GM ingredients.  Thus, the labeling policy does not change 
consumer choices but provides more information that is redundant. There is no addition to social benefit, 
but possibly some increase in administrative costs. The same reasoning could also apply to the other 
corner case solution with no GM at all because consumers are willing to pay sufficiently to avoid GM 
altogether (as is the case in EU).    
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  We now consider an alternative scenario, where some producers have a cost advantage in 
producing GM foods depending on geographical, technical factors, but others do not have such an 
advantage. The latter would produce traditional GM-free foods.  In the benchmark case of voluntary 
labeling, both kinds of foods would be supplied.  If it were profitable to segregate the two foods, the 
market would segregate them and if it were not profitable then the two foods would reach market in an 
unlabeled form.  In this case, there would be some probability that the food would contain GM 
ingredients.   
This situation would not change even after mandatory labeling.  If it were not profitable to 
segregate and label GM-free varieties, even GM-free food would enter the market labeled as GM food. 
Since market size is not viable, producers would not undertake the effort and incur expenses involved in 
segregating and labeling the product.  Thus in the absence of labeling requirements all products would 
enter the market unlabeled and in the presence of labeling requirements all products would be labeled as 
GM.  Here the labeling requirement neither benefits consumers through greater choice nor provides 
increased information.     
In sum, in all these cases, mandatory labeling would make no difference to consumer choice or 
information provision that is useful to consumers.  In the instances where mandatory labeling would 
result in labeled GM-free products, voluntary labeling would result in the same outcome.  Thus, the 
policy is redundant as there is no market failure that can be addressed by mandatory labeling.  The point 
is that product segregation and labeling entails cost, and if the market does not provide sufficient 
incentive to producers to incur such a cost, then regulatory policy also cannot induce them. In fact 
regulatory policy might reduce these incentives by increasing the cost.
 5
                                                 
5 It should be noted that we have assumed that firms have the knowledge about consumer preferences and their 
aversion to GM foods.  If this is not true, mandatory labeling could have impacts not realized in its absence.  While 
it could be unrealistic to assume that firms have perfect knowledge, it is likely that in a competitive market such an 
assumption is closer to reality than it’s opposite.  
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6.  The Role for Government in Voluntary Labeling 
The redundancy of mandatory labeling does not mean that the government does not have a role to 
play.  Consumer concerns can be met by voluntary labeling only if labeling is truthful.  This requires laws 
that would make producers liable to damages if they make claims on labels that cannot be verified.   
Furthermore, even with voluntary labeling, labels could be privately owned or promoted by the 
government.  An instance of a sector where both kinds of labels are available is the organic food sector.  
Exports are the principal market for organic foods produced in India.  Much like GM foods, product 
testing cannot certify organic foods.  The certification of organic agriculture requires special processes of 
production, which makes sure of physical segregation and identity preservation.  The certification is done 
by the agency that owns the label.  For labeling to work, the label must be credible to the consumer.  
Therefore, private labels owned by companies that have good contacts with retail networks in the 
importing countries are more successful than government labels.   
However, private labels need not be a solution in all circumstances.   If the food industry consists 
of a few large players and many small players, then the private labels would tend to be owned and 
promoted by the large firms.  The small firms might find the cost of certification to be too forbidding to 
enter the segment of certified foods.  Second, competing private labels would follow different standards 
of certification in order to product differentiate and fragment the market.  In both these cases, the 
government can facilitate entry by small players and market growth by coordinating standard setting.  In 
the case of organic foods, countries have pursued different approaches to this question.  The United 
States, the European Union and Japan have comprehensive legislation, which defines organic standards, 
and certification agencies (public or private) have to comply with them.  In countries without such laws 
(such as Canada, India), government guidelines for organic standards may exist but are not binding while 
private firms and non-profit organizations handle certification.   
An example of a voluntary but publicly owned label in India is Agmark.  The Agricultural 
Produce (Grading and Marketing) Act lays down specifications for large number of agricultural 
commodities such as pulses, cereals, fruits and vegetables, spices as well as processed foods such as 
edible oils, ghee and vermicelli.  The object is to set the standards for grading.  Products that comply with 
these specifications receive the certification label AGMARK.  Compliance is voluntary except for some 
commodity exports.    
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7.  When Does Mandatory Labeling Make a Difference? 
In an earlier section, we argued that voluntary labeling renders mandatory labeling redundant in 
the sense that mandatory labeling would not result in greater information or product choice to consumers.  
There is, however, a special set of circumstances where mandatory labeling can alter outcomes.  
The underlying assumption of the analysis in Section 5 was that consumer preferences are stable.  
What that means is that consumer preferences between GM and GM-free food do not depend on the label.  
The label provides information and consumers make choices according to their preferences.  However, 
the label itself does not alter preferences.  With stable preferences, Section 5 argued that mandatory 
labeling is redundant.   
But suppose this assumption is not true.  In particular, suppose there are consumers who are 
indifferent between GM and GM-free food but who shift their preference to GM-free food when they see 
a label on GM food possibly because they interpret the label as a signal of low quality.  These are `label-
sensitive’ consumers.
6  In addition, suppose that there are fixed costs (due to the infrastructure for 
segregation and identity preservation) that are incurred in establishing a GM-free marketing channel.  If 
fixed costs are large enough, then it might happen that GM-free foods are not labeled differently from 
GM foods under voluntary labeling but that such distinction does take place under mandatory labeling.   
Consider the following example to clarify the logic.  An economy consists of three types of 
consumers.  When GM-free and GM products are priced identically, α consumers purchase GM products, 
γ consumers purchase only GM-free food while β consumers are label sensitive and consume GM 
products as long as there is no labeling, but switch to GM-free products when there is labeling.  Note it is 
not assumed that these consumers are ignorant about the products they buy and that the switch happens 
for that reason.  The consumers are fully aware of the properties of the foods on offer.  The switch is 
because of a change in preferences triggered by the label.   
Suppose also that there is a single firm in the industry.  Net of variable costs, the firm receives a 
profit r per unit of quantity from the sale of food which is the same whether the product is GM or GM-
free.  However, the provision of GM-free food requires a fixed cost k.  Consider first the case where there 
is no mandatory labeling.  The firm has the choice of either supplying unlabeled or labeled food.  The 
firm’s profit from supplying unlabeled food (i.e., GM products) is (α+β)r as the γ consumers will decline 
                                                 
6 A scenario where labels could change preferences is if it enables anti-GM NGOs mount effective advertising and 
media campaigns against GM foods.    
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to consume the product knowing that it has GM ingredients.  If the firm decides to label its food, then the 
profits from supplying GM food is αr as the β consumers defect to GM-free food.  The profits from 
supplying GM-free food is (β+γ)r – k and the total profits become (α+β+γ)r – k.    
It would not be profitable to label food if (α+β)r > (α+β+γ) r – k  which is the case if the fixed 
costs of labeling are high enough such that k  r γ ≥ .   Now suppose mandatory labeling is in place.  The 
firm has a choice of supplying both types of food or it can supply GM food alone.
7  Once again, profits 
from supplying both GM and GM-free food are (α+β+γ) r – k.  However, profits from supplying GM 
food alone falls to αr as mandatory labeling leads the β consumers to switch to GM-free food.  Hence, the 
firm would supply both products as long as (β+γ) r > k.  Thus, if fixed costs are such that (β+γ) r > k 
r γ ≥ , then we have an instance where GM-free foods would not be supplied without mandatory labeling. 
This example has been deliberately constructed to be simple.  It can be generalized in several 
respects.  The critical assumptions are the existence of label-sensitive consumers and the presence of 
fixed costs.  Without either of these features, mandatory labeling will not result in outcomes any different 
from voluntary labeling.  When mandatory labeling with label-sensitive consumers results in a different 
outcome, the outcomes with and without labeling cannot be ranked in terms of conventional welfare 
criteria because such criteria assume stable preferences.  The outcomes can be ranked only in terms of the 
government’s own objective function.  If the government wishes to shift consumer preferences and hence 
food purchases from GM to GM-free products, then it can justify mandatory labeling.
8  But if it wishes 
labeling to be neutral between these products, then mandatory labeling is not justified.   
                                                 
7 Since there are no fixed costs in the supply of GM food, such food will always be supplied as long as there is a 
market.  Thus, the choice of only supplying GM-free food will never be exercised.   
8 Health warnings such as cigarettes or alcohol clearly fall in the category where it is clear that government would 
like to shift consumer preferences through labeling.    
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8.  Does Labeling Matter to Consumers? 
Any kind of labeling, mandatory or voluntary, presumes that consumers care about the 
characteristics that are labeled.  There has been considerable work attempting to measure the degree of 
aversion to GM foods in Europe and North America.  Consumer surveys typically indicate a large 
preference for GM-free foods.  However, responses to hypothetical questions may not always indicate 
purchasing behavior.  Studies that utilize experiments with real payoffs show that consumers also care 
about price and the price-quality trade-off is an important part of decision-making.   
Such studies do not exist for developing countries.  One issue, which has been found in the 
developed countries as well, is the understanding of GM foods among consumers.  The additional 
complication in India is that with no approved GM food, the responses of consumers to attitude surveys 
can only be hypothetical which can be far removed from their purchasing behavior.   
We considered a more fundamental issue: do quality labels matter to consumers and how much?  
To that end, we conducted a small experiment at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in June 2006.  We set 
up a stall in a popular shopping area in the University in the evening hours.  The subjects who participated 
in the experiment were predominantly students but also included some workers and faculty.   
The participants were faced with a choice of two bags: A and B.  Bag A contained 400 mg of 
apple juice that advertised on its packaging “No preservatives and added colors”.  Bag B also contained 
the same quantity of apple juice but without the same claim.  The market price for the labeled product is 
Rs. 30 while that of the unlabeled product is Rs. 20.  The choice of B (given away free) was accompanied 
by Rs. 20 in cash.  The choice of A (given away free) was accompanied by Rs. x in cash where x was 
drawn by the participant from a box and it could be 0, 5, 10 or 15.  The random payoff was first drawn 
and then the participant was asked to make the choice.   
In this experiment, the difference between Rs. 20 and Rs. x is the amount foregone if the 
participant chooses bag A.  It therefore represents the price of the labeled product.  Out of 90 respondents, 
49 chose the labeled product and 41 chose the unlabeled product.  We found the probability of choosing 
the labeled product to be negatively correlated with its price.  Also women are more likely to choose the 
labeled product than men.   
This small experiment demonstrates the price sensitivity of the demand for labeled products even 
for low price items.  This suggests that it would be difficult to assess the demand for labeled GM-free 
products from hypothetical attitude surveys.  It also showed that the importance of labeling will vary with 
social groups.    
  18
The fact that the demand for the labeled `high quality’ product is negatively correlated with its 
price means that suppliers have to consider the trade-offs between market share and labeling.  As noted 
earlier in section 5, it is this trade-off that determines the supply of labeled products.  Under stable 
preferences, mandatory labeling requirements will not alter this trade-off and hence the supply of labeled 
products.   
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9.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
India is considering a labeling policy for GM foods.  The Health Ministry has proposed the use of 
mandatory labels on GM foods.  While international approaches are varied, the Indian proposal if 
accepted would make Indian laws the most stringent globally.  Is this an optimal policy for India?   
  We consider two arguments for mandatory labeling.  First is the case when mandatory 
labeling is justified by known adverse impacts on health.  However, we show that if a product has known 
adverse health effects for all consumers then the appropriate policy should be to either prohibit the sale 
and use of product or to impose minimum quality standards.  Mandatory labeling should not be advocated 
when quality standards can be used.  
  The second argument is based on the right to know.  Some consumers may not wish to 
consume GM foods because of religious or ethical preferences or because they believe GM foods could 
have adverse health impacts in the future but which are not detectable at present.  For any of these 
reasons, these consumers would like to know what they are consuming.  GM labeling makes sense only 
when it is accompanied by information that verifies the labeled status.  In the typical case, a food product 
cannot be verified to be GM-free unless the identity of the product is preserved through the production 
and marketing chain.  This is a costly process.  This would, at least initially (as the GM-free food segment 
would be a lot smaller), make GM-free foods much more expensive than GM products.  Greater is the 
stringency of regulation, greater would be the price-premium commanded by GM-free products.  As 
consumers typically consider price in their purchase decisions, the market share of GM-free products is 
likely to be small which means that such products are not likely to be supplied at all irrespective of 
whether the government mandates labeling or not.  On the other hand, if consumer preferences are such 
that they are willing to pay considerable premiums for GM-free food, then no GM food would be supplied 
irrespective of whether the government mandates labeling or not.   
  Because of these fundamental economic considerations, mandatory labeling is likely to 
be redundant in the sense that it would not alter the quantities of GM-free food that is sold.  In other 
words, the right to know argument can be addressed just as well by voluntary labeling.   It should be 
noted that labeling, mandatory or voluntary, does not necessarily provide information to all consumers 
who need it.   In particular, if the number of consumers willing to pay a premium for GM-free foods is not 
large enough, then the small minority of consumers who wish to know whether a food is genetically 
modified will not receive this information either through voluntary labeling or mandatory labeling.    
The exception occurs when consumers do not have stable preferences and when additional fixed 
costs are incurred in the production of GM-free products.  In this case, as we have shown, mandatory  
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labeling can result in greater market share for GM-free products.  Whether this is good or bad depends on 
whether this is the goal of the government.  One possible scenario where this could happen is if the bulk 
of GM food is supplied by imports.  Then mandatory labeling could be a way of influencing consumption 
away from imports and protecting domestic producers.   The mandatory labeling policy could also be seen 
as a substitute for a lack of infrastructure for screening GM food imports.  Finally, while the paper has not 
considered the implementability of labeling laws, this will be an important issue as most of the foods in 
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